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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE
INCOME AND GIFT TAX CONSEQUENCES OF
INTEREST-FREE LOANS*
The sale of property brings tax consequences for both the seller1 and
the buyer.' When a seller sells property, the Internal Revenue Service
(Service) imposes an income tax if the seller realizes a gain.3 The Service
determines the amount of gain by measuring the difference between the
seller's basis4 in the property and the consideration the seller receives
for the property from the buyer.' If the seller realizes no gain, the Ser-
* The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Hardee
v. United States is the most recent development affecting the income tax consequences of
interest-free loans. See infra note 151 (brief analysis of Federal Circuit's decision in Hardee).
See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3)(West 1983) (seller's gross income includes gains derived from
dealings in property).
2 See I.R.C. S 1012 (West 1983) (with limited exception, buyer's basis in property is
cost of property).
' See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3)(West 1983) (gross income includes gains derived from dealings
in property). Under § 1001(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code), the gain from the transfer
of property is the amount realized from the transfer less the adjusted basis. Id. 5 1001(a).
Section 1001(b) defines "amount realized" as the sum of any money plus the value of other
property the taxpayer received from the transfer of the property. Id. S 1001(b). The basis
of property is the cost of the property, and the adjusted basis is the cost of the property
adjusted for certain additions and reductions. See id. S 1011 (adjusted basis for determining
loss or gain); id. § 1016 (allowable adjustments to basis). If the taxpayer's adjusted basis
in property exceeds the amount realized from the sale of the property, the taxpayer suffers
a loss. See id. § 1001(a) (determination of loss). Under S 1001(c), the taxpayer is obligated
to recognize the entire amount of gain or loss. Id. § 1001(c).
' See supra note 2 (basis in property is cost of property).
See I.R.C. 5 1001(b}(West 1983) (amount realized from the transfer of property is
sum of any money realized plus fair market value of property received). The amount realized
includes the amount of seller's obligations that the buyer assumes or cancels as part of
the purchase price. See Evangelista v. Commissioner, 629 F.2d 1218, 1219-21 (7th Cir. 1980)
(taxpayer realized gain on transfer of cars to trust for children when trust assumed and
paid taxpayer's indebtedness on cars); Brodhead v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (P-H) 79,113
at 488-92 (1979) (same); Stevenson Consol. Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 610, 615 (1931)
(amount seller realized included buyer's assumption of seller's indebtedness to third party).
Compensation payment in the form of property of value in excess of basis results in taxable
gain to the employer. See Riley v. Commissioner, 328 F.2d 428, 429 (5th Cir. 1964) (employer's
gain was extent value of employee's services exceeded employer's adjusted basis in proper-
ty); International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310, 313 (2d Cir. 1943)
(employer's gain was excess of fair market value of property at time of transfer over
employer's basis in property). When a husband transfers property to his wife in settlement
of his obligation to support her, the husband realizes a gain to the extent the value of
the rights the wife releases exceed the husband's basis in the property. See United States
v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 71-74 (1962) (transfer of stock to wife to satisfy property settlement
was taxable event and resulted in realized gain to husband to extent fair market value
of stock exceeded husband's basis); Wallace v. United States, 439 F.2d 757, 759 (8th Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 831 (1971).
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vice views the proceeds from the sale as a return of the seller's invest-
ment and imposes no income tax.6 The consideration the buyer gave for
the property is the buyer's basis in the property The buyer will use this
basis to compute gain on subsequent sale of the property.8
When a seller gratuitously transfers property for less than the fair
market value of the property,9 the seller realizes a gain only if the amount
the buyer pays for the property exceeds the seller's basis in the property."°
To the extent the amount the seller receives for the property is less than
the fair market value of the property, the seller has made a gift." The
Internal Revenue Code (Code) defines gift as any transfer of property from
one person to another without adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth. Under the Code, property includes every legally pro-
tected right or interest that has an exchangeable value." The Service
6 Cf. Treas. Reg. S 1.1001-1(a)(1957) (computation of gain or loss realized on sale of
property).
See I.R.C. S 1012 (West 1983). With limited exception, S 1012 of the Code provides
that a buyer's basis in property is the cost of the property. Id. The cost of the property
is the amount paid in cash or other property. Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-2(a) (1957); see Consolidated
Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 446, 447-49 (3d Cir. 1934) (buyer's basis includes amount
of seller's liabilities buyer assumed); Roberts v. Granquist, 4 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 59-5297
at 5972 (Or. 1959) (same); Oxford Paper Co. v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 366,368 (S.D.N.Y.
1949) (same); see also Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 11 (1947) (buyer's basis includes
amount of mortgage subject to which buyer acquired property).
8 See I.R.C. 5 1001(a)(West 1983) (gain from sale of property is amount realized less
adjusted basis); supra note 3 (computation of gain on sale of property).
' See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2)(1972). Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-1(c)(2) defines
"fair market value" as the price at which property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller when neither is under any compulsion to sell and both have
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. Id.
" See I.R.C. § 1001(a)(West 1983) (gain from sale of property is amount realized from
sale less adjusted basis); supra note 3 (adjusted basis).
- See I.R.C. § 2512 (West 1983); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958). The gift tax is not limited
to transfers made without valuable consideration. Id. The gift tax also extends to sales
of property for consideration to the extent the value of the property transferred exceeds
the value of the consideration given. Id.; see J. George Spitz Trust v. Commissioner, 40
T.C.M. (P-H) 71,008 at 54-56 (1971) (sale of real estate for less than value was taxable
gift); Casnet v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 40,189 at 241 (1940) (value of property
conveyed from father to daughter had value in excess of consideration given and amount
in excess was subject to gift tax). A sale of property in the ordinary course of business
is considered made for adequate and full consideration. Treas. Reg. S 25.2512-8. A sale made
in the ordinary course of business is a transaction which is bona fide, at arm's length, and
free from donative intent. Id.; see Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306, 307 (1945)
(transfer not made in ordinary course of business subject to gift tax when not made for
adequate and full consideration); Small v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (P-H) 69,211 at 1214
(1969) (transfer of property to children not transfer in ordinary course of business but transfer
made for less than adequate and full consideration and thus taxable to extent value of prop-
erty transferred was greater than consideration received). When the consideration given
is not reducible to a value in money or money's worth, then the entire value of the property
transferred constitutes the amount of the gift. Treas. Reg. S 25.2512-8.
1' See I.R.C. § 2512(b)(West 1983) (definition of gift).
13 H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 457,
476; S. REP. No. 665, 72 Cong., 1st Sess. 39, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 496, 524.
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imposes on a donor a gift tax on any transfer of property by gift a donor
makes during the taxable year. 4 The gift tax is not a tax on property,
but a tax on the exercise of a donor's right during life to transfer prop-
erty to others in the form of gifts."5
Ordinarily when a lender loans property to another, no gift tax conse-
quences arise for the lender and no income tax consequences occur for
the borrower." The borrower assumes not only an obligation to repay
the face amount of the loan, the borrower also pays the lender an interest
fee for the use of the loan. 1'7 The Code treats interest payments as income
to the lender'8 and, with few exceptions, allows the borrower to deduct
the interest payment from gross income.'9 When the borrower assumes
" See I.R.C. 5 2501(a)(1)(West 1983). Section 2501(a)(1) of the Code imposes a tax on
the transfer of property by gift. Id. The donor is liable for the tax imposed under 5 2501.
Id. § 2502(c). But see Ekman, Liability of the Donee for Donor's Gift Tax, 14 INST. ON EST.
PLAN. 1000, 1002.1 (1980) (donee may be liable in some circumstances for donor's un-
paid gift tax).
" Treas. Reg. § 25.0-1(b)(1958). The gift tax is a tax on the transfer of property by
individuals and thus not applicable to transfers by corporations or persons other than in-
dividuals. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 708, supra note 13, at 27-28 (gift tax designed to cover
all transactions in which a property right is donatively passed to another).
18 See Fisher v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 433, 439 (1934) (loans not income to recipient).
See Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940) (defining interest as compensation
for use or forbearance of money); see also Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating
& Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 145 (1974) (quoting Deputy v. DuPont); United States v. Midland-
Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 57 (1965) (same); I.R.C. S 461(gl(1)(A)(West 1983) (interest defined
as charge for use or forbearance of money).
18 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(4)(West 1983) (gross income includes income received from interest
payments).
" See I.R.C. 5 163(a}(West 1983). Section 163(a) of the Code allows a taxpayer to deduct
all interest paid or accrued during the taxable year on indebtedness. Id. Unlike many other
deductions, the Code allows a taxpayer to deduct interest expenses the taxpayer paid or
accrued whether the expenses served a business purpose or not. See Preston v. Commis-
sioner, 132 F.2d 763, 766 (2d Cir. 1942) (interest paid on mortgage no less permissible deduc-
tion under Code § 163 than interest paid on loan for business purposes); Woodward v. United
States, 106 F. Supp. 14, 21 (N.D. Iowa 1952) (indebtedness under Code S 163 not limited
to debts incurred to produce income, but includes any actual indebtedness, even though
incurred for taxpayer's personal reasons), afj'd, 208 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1953); McNutt-Boyce
Co. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 462, 465 (1962) (under Code S 163 Congress intended to allow
taxpayer to deduct all interest paid on indebtedness whether or not ordinary and necessary
expense or incurred in carrying on of trade or business), aff'd per curiam, 324 F.2d 957
(5th Cir. 1963). To qualify for the interest deduction, the Code requires an indebtedness,
that interest developed on the indebtedness, and that the taxpayer paid or accrued the
interest expense during the taxable year. See Commissioner v. Philadelphia Transp. Co.,
174 F.2d 255, 256 (3d Cir.) (requirements for interest expense deduction), afj'd per curiam,
338 U.S. 883 (1949); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 368, 372 (1933)
(same), affid, 78 F.2d 460 (4th Cir. 1935).
Deductions are not allowed for all interest expenses. Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72
T.C. 931, 948 (1979), affid, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982); see I.R.C. S 163 (interest expense
deduction). For example, the Code does not permit a taxpayer who does not use a loan
for business purposes and does not itemize deductions to deduct interest payments on the
loan. See I.R.C. § 63(b) (taxable income defined). Even taxpayers who itemize deductions
may not deduct under the Code interest payments on indebtedness incurred to purchase
1983] 1687
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an obligation to repay the principal of the loan plus interest, no gift occurs
because the face amount of the loan plus interest constitutes adequate
consideration for the loan."0
When a lender loans money interest-free, the borrower assumes an
obligation to repay the face amount of the loan but has no obligation to
pay an interest expense." Although the Service imputes no gross income
to the lender,' the Service analogizes the interest-free use of money to
the rent-free use of property and argues that to the extent the lender
relieves the borrower of any duty to pay interset, the borrower realizes
a taxable gain.' The Service uses this same property analogy in arguing
that interest-free loans to a relative constitute gifts from the lender to
the borrower and as such fall under the gift tax provisions of the Code.u
The Tax Court has refused to accept the Service's property analogy and
chooses instead to equate interest-free loans to interest-bearing loans.5
investments paying tax exempt interest. Greenspun, 72 T.C. at 948; see I.R.C. S 265(2) (in-
terest relating to tax exempt income). A taxpayer may not deduct under the Code interest
paid or accrued on indebtedness incurred to secure single premium life insurance endow-
ment, or annuity contracts. Goldman v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 137, 141 (W.D. Okla.
1967), affd, 403 F.2d 776 (10th Cir. 1968); see I.R.C. S 264 (interest relating to insurance
contracts). The Code also disallows a deduction for certain interest expenses a noncorporate
taxpayer paid or accured to carry investment property which produces little or no current
income. Emmons v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 26, 32 (1958), aff'd sub nom. Weller v. Commis-
sioner, 270 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1959); see I.R.C. S 163(d)(1) (interest relating to investment in-
debtedness). In addition, a taxpayer may not take an interest expense deduction in certain
sham transactions. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 362-70 (1960) (no in-
terest expense deduction allowed taxpayer in transaction which created no actual in-
debtedness). See generally Martin v. Commissioner 649 F.2d 1133, 1140-41 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting) (nondeductible interest expenses).
Cf. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958) (transfers for insufficient consideration).
21 Cf. Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940) (defining interest as compensation
for use or forbearance of money); I.R.C. S 461(gXWest 1983) (interest defined as charge for
use or forbearance of money).
I See Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 416, 447 (1960) (no accrual
of interest to lender on interest-free loans), acq., 1960-2 C.B. 4.
1 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Greenspun, 670 F.2d 123, 124 (9th Cir. 1982) (Service argues
that interest-free use of corporate funds should occasion same income tax results as rent-
free use of other corporate assets); Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133, 1133 (5th Cir.
1981) (same); Suttle v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 1127, 1128 (4th Cir. 1980) (same); Dean v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083, 1087 (1961) (same), nonacq., 1973-2 C.B. 4.
z" See Dickman v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 812, 815 (11th Cir. 1982) (Service argued
lender made gift to borrower of value of use of interest-free loan); Crown v. Commissioner,
585 F.2d 234, 235 (7th Cir. 1978) (same); Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73, 76 (N.D.
Tex. 1966) (same); I.R.C. S§ 2501-2524 (Code gift tax provisions).
I See, e.g., Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1009, 1011 (1979) (tax benefit of excluding
from income use value of interest-free loan matches benefit attributable to interest deduc-
tion on interest-bearing loan), affd sub nom. Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th
Cir. 1981); Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931, 947-48 (1979) (interest-free loan is in
substance no different from a loan on which interest is charged), affd, 670 F.2d 123 (9th
Cir. 1982); Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083, 1090 (1961) (borrowers of interest-free loans
entitled to same tax treatment as borrowers of interest-bearing loans), nonacq, 1973-2 C.B. 4.
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The Tax Court takes the position that because interest-free loans are
economically indistinguishable from interest-bearing loans, interest-free
loans pose neither gift tax consequences for the lender26 nor income tax
consequences for the borrower. 7 Although failing in the Tax Court and in
the Seventh Circuit, the Service recently has been successful in convinc-
ing the Eleventh Circuit of the gift tax consequences of interest-free loans
to family members' and in convincing the Court of Claims that the interest-
free use of corporate money constitutes a gain taxable to the borrower.29
The seminal case on the income tax consequences of interest-free loans
is Dean v. Commissioner.2 The taxpayers in Dean received interest-free
loans from their wholly-owned corporation.3 ' The Service asserted a defi-
ciency in the amount of the economic benefit the taxpayers derived from
their interest-free use of corporate funds.2 2 The Service relied on several
cases in which courts found the rent-free use of property to constitute
gross income and argued that no difference existed between a taxpayer's
use of property for less than adequate consideration and a taxpayer's use
of money for less than the market rate of interest.' The Tax Court
' See Dickman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 620, 624 (1980) (Tax Court held interest-
free loans not taxable as gifts), rev'd, 690 F.2d 812 (11th Cir. 1982); Crown v. Commissioner,
67 T.C. 1060, 1064-65 (1977) (same), affd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
7 See, e.g., Parks v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1228, 1230 (1980) (Tax Court held
interest-free loans did not constitute taxable benefit to borrower), affd, 686 F.2d 408 (6th
Cir. 1982); Martin v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 531, 535 (1979) (same), affd, 649 F.2d
1133 (5th Cir. 1981); Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931, 945-50 (1979) (same), aff'd, 670
F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982); Suttle v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1638, 1639 (1978) (same),
affd, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980); Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083, 1090 (1961), nonacq.,
1973-2 C.B. 4.
1 See Dickman v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 812, 813, 819-20 (11th Cir. 1982) (court held
interest-free loans subject to gift tax).
, See Hardee v. Commissioner, 50 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 82-5079 at 5256 (Ct. Cl. 1982)
(court held value of interest-free loan includible in taxpayer's income).
" 35 T.C. 1083 (1961), nonacq., 1973-2 C.B. 4.
"1 35 T.C. 1083. The taxpayers in Dean obtained interest-free loans in excess of $2
million from a corporation the taxpayers controlled. Id. at 1088.
1 Id. at 1087. The Service argued that the taxpayers realized income to the extent
of the economic benefit derived from the free use of borrowed funds. Id. According to the
Service, the economic benefit was equal to the market rate of interest. Id.
' Id. at 1089-90. As support for the position that the interest-free use of corporate
funds results in a taxable benefit, the Service in Dean relied primarily upon a series of
cases holding that a stockholder's or officer's rent-free use of corporate property results
in realization of income. Id.; see Dean v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 1019, 1020 (3d Cir. 1951)
(rent-free use of corporate house held to result in taxable income); Chandler v. Commis-
sioner, 119 F.2d 623, 626-28 (3d Cir. 1941) (rent-free use of corporate house and farm held
to result in taxable income); Rogers Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 66, 73-74 (1950)
(personal use of corporate automobile held to result in taxable income); Reynard Corp. v.
Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 451, 453 (1934) (rent-free use of corporate house held to result
in taxable income); Frueauff v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 449, 451 (1934) (rent-free use of
corporate apartment held to result in taxable income); cf. Silverman v. Commissioner, 253
F.2d 849, 853 (8th Cir. 1958) (payment of taxpayer's wife's trip to Europe by taxpayer's
19831 1689
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distinguished Dean on the fact that if the taxpayers in Dean actually had
paid interest, the taxpayers then could have deducted their interest
payments from gross income. 4 The Dean majority reasoned that because
an equivalent deduction from gross income would have balanced the in-
clusion in income of the benefit of the interest-free loan, no reason existed
to include the benefit in the taxpayers' gross income." Concurring 6 and
dissenting" opinions disagreed with the Dean majority's conclusion that
corporation resulted in taxable benefit to taxpayer); Greenspun v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d
947, 956 (8th Cir. 1956) (living expenses paid by taxpayer's corporation constituted taxable
gain); Chester Distrib. Co. v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 514, 515 (3d Cir. 1950) (entertainment
expenses held to be nondeductible business expenses).
35 T.C. at 1090. The Dean court distinguished Dean from the cases the Service cited
on the basis of the deductibility of the value of the benefit the taxpayers received. Id.
According to the Dean court, the taxpayers in each of the cited cases received a benefit
in circumstances that if the taxpayers had purchased the benefit, the taxpayers could not
have deducted the expense. Id.; see supra note 33 (case authority for Service's position in
Dean).
s 35 T.C. at 1090; see I.R.C. S 163 (West 1983) (interest expense deductible).
See 35 T.C. at 1090-91 (Opper, J. concurring). Judge Opper characterized the majority's
statement that an interest-free loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower as much
too broad a generalization. Id. at 1091 (Opper, J. concurring); see id. at 1090 (Dean majority's
statement). Although Judge Opper agreed with the ultimate holding of the Dean majority,
Judge Opper disagreed with the majority's presumption of a deduction for interest payments
on an interest-bearing loan. See id at 1090-91 (Opper, J. concurring); see id. at 1090 (Dean
majority's holding). To refute the rationale for the majority's opinion that the borrower
of an interest-free loan should not recognize income because the borrower of an interest-
bearing loan receives an interest expense deduction, Judge Opper cited S 265(2) of the Code.
See id. at 1091 (Opper, J. concurring); id. at 1090 (rationale for Dean majority's holding);
I.R.C. § 265(2XWest 1983). Section 265(2) of the Code denies a deduction for interest or in-
debtedness which the borrower incurs to purchase tax exempt securities. See id. According
to Judge Opper, the recipient of an interest-free loan recognizes gross income which a cor-
responding interest deduction may or may not offset depending on the nature of the loan.
35 T.C. at 1091 (Opper, J. concurring). Judges Tietjens, Withey, and Drennen agreed with
Judge Opper's concurrence. See id.
I See 35 T.C. at 1091-92 (Bruce, J. dissenting). Judge Bruce agreed with Judge Opper's
concurrence to the Dean decision in which Judge Opper characterized the Dean majority's
statement that an interest-free loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower as much
too broad a generalization. Id. at 1091 (Bruce, J. dissenting); see id. (Opper, J. concurring);
id. at 1090 (Dean majority's holding). Judge Bruce also characterized as too broad the ma-
jority's holding that had the taxpayers borrowed the funds in question on interest-bearing
notes, the taxpayers could have deducted their interest payments under S 163 of the Code.
Id. at 1092 (Bruce, J. dissenting); see I.R.C. S 163 (West 1983) (deduction allowed for interest
expenses paid or accrued). Judge Bruce relied on § 265 of the Code to refute the majority's
presumption that borrowers of interest-bearing loans may deduct interest expenses. 35 T.C.
at 1092 (Bruce, J. dissenting); see id. at 1091 (Opper, J. concurring) (Judge Opper's reliance
on S 265 to refute Dean majority's holding); I.R.C. § 265(2) (denial of deduction for interest
on indebtedness which borrower incurs to purchase tax exempt securities). According to
Judge Bruce, the taxpayers failed to prove that S 163 of the Code would have entitled
them to an interest expense deduction had the taxpayers actually paid an interest expense.
35 T.C. at 1092 (Bruce, J. dissenting).
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an interest-free loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower." Despite
the Service's nonacquiescence in the Dean decision, 9 the Tax Court has
continued its offsetting deductibility rationale in holding that the interest-
free use of money does not result in a taxable gain. °
1 35 T.C. at 1090-92. In Greenspun v. Commissioner, the Tax Court re-examined its
holding in Dean. See 72 T.C. 931, 945-50 (1979), affd, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982). The tax-
payer in Greenspan received a low interest-bearing loan from an unrelated party in return
for certain services. Id. at 945. The Service in Greenspun argued that the bargain interest
element of the loan was income to the taxpayer because no arm's length loan would have
carried as low an interest rate. Id. at 941. Although the Tax Court found that the granting
of the interest-free loan was in consideration for future services, the court relied on Dean
in holding that the taxpayer realized no taxable income. Id. at 946. The Greenspan court
reasoned that an interest-free loan is in reality no different from the making of a loan in
which the lender charges the borrower a deductible interest expense. Id. at 948. Despite
the Tax Court's use of the offsetting-deductibility rationale in both Dean and Greenspun,
the Greenspan court held that the Dean court's finding of no taxable income to the bor-
rower was not grounded on an imputed interest deduction but on the conclusion that an
interest-free loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower. Id at 946; see id at 948 (Greenspun
court's use of offsetting-deductibility rationale to deny taxation of interest-free loans); 35
T.C. at 1090 (Dean court's use of offsetting-deductibility rationale to deny taxation of interest-
free loans). But see 72 T.C. at 946 (Greenspun court's holding that court's finding of no tax-
able income in Dean was not founded on an offsetting-deductibility rationale). The Greenspun
court's explanation of the court's rationale in Dean is not entirely clear. See Comment, Interest-
Free Loans and the Tax Court: A New Look at an Old Problem, 30 CATH. U. L. REv. 497,
504 n.36 (1981) (Greenspun court's explanation of Dean court's rationale less clear than Dean
rationale).
Although affirming the court's decision in Dean, the Greenspun court did admit to some
possible exceptions to the Dean court's holding that interest-free loans result in no taxable
gain to the borrower. 72 T.C. at 947-49; see 35 T.C. at 1090 (Dean court's holding). According
to Greenspun, exception to the Dean holding that interest-free loans result in no taxable
gain to the borrower would apply to cases in which the equating of interest-bearing and
noninterest-bearing loans would result in a wide discrepancy in tax treatment. 72 T.C. at
950. One exception to the Dean court's holding would apply to the taxpayer who invested
the proceeds of an interest-free loan in tax exempt securities. Id. at 948-49; see I.R.C. S
265(2)(West 1983) (interest deduction denied for interest payments on loans used to secure
tax exempt securities). The Greenspun court held, however, that such a situation did not
confront the court and that until such time as the question did present itself, the issue
of Dean's applicability to § 265(2) loans would remain open. 72 T.C. at 950.
In Zager v. Commissioner, the Tax Court reiterated the Greenspun court's S 265(2)
exception to the Dean holding. 72 T.C. 1009, 1012 (1979), affid sub nom. Martin v. Commis-
sioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981). The Zager court also noted that in reality little dif-
ference exists between interest-free use of corporate funds and a shareholder's rent-free
use of corporate property. Id. at 1011. Despite the fact that the Zager court found that
conceptually the gratuitous use of corporate funds and corporate property should result
in the same tax treatment, the Zager court sustained its holding in Dean. Id. 1014. The
Zager court relied in large part on the previous failure of the Service to assert the tax-
ability of interest-free loans. Id. at 1013. The Zager court recommended that if the Service
now wished to tax interest-free loans, authority for such action should come from the
legislature rather than a judicial departure from the rule of stare decisis. Id. at 1014.
3 See 1973-2 C.B. 4. (Service's nonacquiescence in Dean decision).
'" See supra note 27 (Tax Court decisions following holding in Dean).
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Although four of the circuit courts of appeals have followed the Tax
Court's decision in Dean," the Court of Claims in Hardee v. United States42
recently departed from the Dean decision."3 The taxpayer in Hardee
obtained interest-free loans from a corporation of which he was president
and majority shareholder." The Service assessed a deficiency as measured
by the interest the taxpayer would have paid in an arm's length
transaction.'5 Analogizing the interest-free use of corporate money to the
gratuitous use of corporate property, the Court of Claims agreed with
the Service's position that the interest-free use of corporate money brings
no less a taxable economic gain to the borrower than the rent-free use
of corporate property. 6 The Court of Claims disagreed with the Dean
court's off-setting deductibility rationale.' Citing statutory authority, the
Hardee court reasoned that the Code provides a deduction only for in-
terest the taxpayer paid or accrued during the taxable year. 8 Because
the taxpayer in Hardee neither paid nor accrued an interest expense, the
41 See Parks v. Commissioner, 686 F.2d 408, 409 (6th Cir. 1982) (reliance on Tax Court's
holding in Dean), affg, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1228 (1980); Commissioner v. Greenspun, 670 F.2d
123, 125 (9th Cir. 1982) (same), affg, 72 T.C. 931 (1979); Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d
1133, 1134 (5th Cir. 1981) (sagme), ajg, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 531 (1979); Suttle v. Commissioner,
625 F.2d 1127, 1128 (4th Cir. 1980) (same), affg, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1638 (1978).
" 50 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 82-5079 (Ct. Cl. 1982), reversed, 708 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
0 See id. at 82-5254 (Hardee court departs from Tax Court's decision in Dean). But
see infra note 151 (Hardee reversal).
" Id. at 82-5253.
"Id.
Id. at 82-5254. The Hardee court cited statutory and case authority to support the
court's departure from the Dean decision. Id.; see Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,
348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955) (Court supports liberal construction of S 61 to include all gains
as taxable income); I.R.C. S 61 (West 1982) (gross income includes gains or profits and in-
come derived from any source whatever). According to the Hardee court, in-kind benefits
represent taxable gain as much as cash benefits. 50 A.F.T.R.2d at 82-5254; see Commis-
sioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945) (taxable income includes any economic or financial
benefit regardless of form or mode). The Hardee court relied on case authority to conclude
that the economic benefit realized through the free use of corporate assets compels the
recognition of income to the extent of the market value of that use. 50 A.F.T.R.2d at 82-5254;
see Gardner v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d 160, 160 (6th Cir. 1980) (free use of company owned
car held to result in taxable gain); Chandler v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 623, 626-28 (3d Cir.
1941) (rent-free use of corporate residence held to result in taxable gain); Challenge Mfg.
Co. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 650, 658-63 (1962) (rent-free use of company owned boat held
to result in taxable gain); Frueauff v. ,Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 449, 451 (1934) (rent-free
use of corporate apartment held to result in taxable gain). The Hardee court also relied
on cases holding that third party payment of taxpayer's debt results in taxable gain. 50
A.F.T.R.2d at 82-5255; see Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929)
(corporation's payment of employee's taxes resulted in taxable gain); Dolese v. United States,
605 F.2d 1146, 1152 (10th Cir. 1979) (corporation's payment of shareholder's litigation expenses
resulted in taxable gain), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
11 50 A.F.T.R.2d at 82-5255 to 5256; see supra text accompanying notes 34 & 35 (Dean
court's off-setting deductibility rationale).
11 50 A.F.T.R.2d at 82-5255; see I.R.C. S 163(al(West 1983) (taxpayer allowed to deduct
expenses paid or accrued during taxable year).
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taxpayer could not take a deduction.49 The Hardee court held that
regardless of whether the interest-free loan is economically in-
distinguishable from an interest-bearing loan with its corresponding deduc-
tion, the Code does not permit a taxpayer to deduct a cost he neither
paid nor accrued., A deduction does not depend upon general equitable
considerations but upon legislative grace, and nowhere does the Code allow
a deduction for a cost the taxpayer does not incur."1 The court reasoned
that sound administration of tax law demands that courts base decisions
on actual facts rather than possible facts.2 Besides statutory impediments
'9 50 A.F.T.R.2d at 82-5256.
Id. at 82-5255; see I.R.C. § 163(a)(West 1983) (taxpayer allowed to deduct expenses
paid or accrued during taxable year).
5' 50 A.F.T.R.2d at 82-5255. To support the conclusion that a taxpayer cannot take
a deduction when a taxpayer has not incurred an expense, the Hardee court relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating. Id.; see 417 U.S.
134, 152-55 (1974) (no interest deduction allowed when no cost was incurred).
1 50 A.F.T.R.2d at 82-5255. In Greenspun v. Commissioner, the Tax Court dismissed
the Service's argument that S 163(a) of the Code does not entitle the recipient of an interest-
free loan to a deduction. 72 T.C. 931, 951 (1979), afj'd, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982). The
Service reasoned that the recipient of an interest-free loan fails to satisfy the S 163(a) re-
quirement granting a deduction only for interest expenses actually paid or incurred. Id.;
see I.R.C. § 163(a) (West 1983) (deduction allowed for all interest paid or accrued within
the taxable year on indebtedness). The Service relied on case authority to support the con-
tention that a taxpayer must incur an interest expense before S 163(a) will allow a deduc-
tion. 72 T.C. at 951; see Christiansen v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 563, 577-78 (1963) (cash basis
taxpayer may deduct accrued interest only when actually paid); D. Loveman & Son Export
Corp. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 776,805-806 (1960) (interest may not be accrued and deducted
when no obligation to pay interest exists), afj'd, 296 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1961), eert. denied,
369 U.S. 860 (1962); Howell Turpentine Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 364, 394 (1946) (interest
deduction must be taken in taxable year during which taxpayer incurs interest expense),
rev'd on other grounds, 162 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1947). The Greenspun court dismissed the
cases the Service relied on because none of the cases dealt with interest-free loans. 72 T.C.
at 951. The Greenspun court reasoned that the need to recognize the economic realities
of the interest-free loan necessitated an exception to the general rule requiring payment
or accrual before a taxpayer may deduct an interest expense. Id.
In Martin v. Commissioner, Judge Goldberg in his dissenting opinion not only faulted
the majority for its failure to depart from Dean, he also criticized the Service for its technical
reading of §163(a). 649 F.2d 1133, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1981) (Goldberg, J. dissenting). According
to Judge Goldberg, the Service's literal interpretation of S 163(a) as requiring the payment
or accrual of an interest expense before allowing a deduction puts the recipient of an interest-
free loan in a less advantageous tax position than the recipient of an interest bearing loan.
Id. In support of his proposition, Judge Goldberg gave the example of two taxpayers (A
and B) who earn incomes of $10,100 and $10,000 respectively. Id. at 1137. Taxpayer A secures
an interest-bearing loan of $1000 for $100. Id. Taxpayer B secures an interest-free loan
of $1000. Id. Taxpayer A, because of the § 163(a) interest expense deduction allowance,
pays income tax on only $10,000. Id. Taxpayer B, on the other hand, must pay income tax
on $10,100, which amount represents taxpayer B's earned income plus the value of his interest-
free loan. Id. The net effect of making a deduction dependent upon a paid or accrued expense
is to impose different tax liability on two taxpayers who are in identical economic positions.
Id. In place of the Service's strict interpretation of S 163(a), Judge Goldberg suggests that
the Service first examine whether the recipient of an interest-free loan would have been
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to the Dean court's conclusion, the Court of Claims also found that the
Dean court's attempt to equalize the tax treatment of the noninterest-
paying borrower with the interest-paying borrower actually reversed any
disparity in favor of the noninterest paying borrower.'
The first-case to question the taxability of interest-free loans to family
members was Johnson v. United States.- In Johnson, the taxpayer made
a series of noninterest-bearing loans to his children.5 5 Analogizing the
receipt of an interest-free loan to the rent-free use of property, the Ser-
vice attempted to impose on the lender a gift tax on the value of the use
of the money transferred., The Johnson court ruled against the imposi-
tion of a gift tax.5 ' Essential to the district court's decision in Johnson
was the court's determination that the loans in question were not veiled
attempts to reduce estate taxes by means of inter vivos transfers. The
Johnson court also reasoned that taxpayers are under no obligation to
invest money for profit. 9 Because no investment duty exists, the court
refused to impute a gift tax on the amount of profit the lender would
have earned if the lender had invested the loaned funds at the current
market rate of interest."
The Service announced its nonacquiescence in Johnson in Revenue
Ruling 73-61." In Revenue Ruling 73-61, the Service held that low interest
entitled to an interest expense deduction if the taxpayer had paid or accrued an interest
expense. Id. When the taxpayer could have deducted the interest on an interest-free loan
if he actually had paid or accrued the expense, the Service should charge no net taxable
income as a result of the interest-free loan. Id.
' 50 A.F.T.R.2d at 82-5255 to 5256. The Hardee court reasoned that the Dean decision
yielded the disproportionate result of permitting the interest-free borrower to enjoy the
benefit of a loan without any adverse economic consequences whatsoever. Id. According
to the Hardee court, the interest-free borrower has no up-front borrowing costs, nor does
the borrowing occasion any tax consequences. Id.
254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
Id. The loans in Johnson were repayable on demand. Id. The borrowers repaid most
of the loans the taxpayer made prior to the taxpayer's death. Id.
I Id. The Service in Johnson argued that in each of the years in question, the tax-
payer made a gift of the value of the use of the money at 3 1/2% per year on the average
unpaid balance for each year. Id.
Id. at 77.
Id. The Johnson court based its finding that the taxpayer was not attempting to
diminish his estate taxes on the fact that the borrowers of the loans had repaid most of
the loans prior to the taxpayer's death. Id. The court also found that the unpaid amount
of the loans appeared on the taxpayer's books and was includible as an asset of the estate
in arriving at estate taxes. Id. See generally Tax Reform Act of 1976, 26 U.S.C. S 2502 (1976)
(unified gift and estate tax rates). Previous to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 when Congress
placed gift taxes on an equal basis with estate taxes, taxpayers could avoid the higher
estate taxes on transfers of property at death by making inter vivos property transfers
at the lower gift tax rates. Cf. id.
" 254 F. Supp. at 77.
60 Id.
61 1973-1 C.B. 408; see infra note 77 (Seventh Circuit in Crown faults Service for waiting
seven years to announce nonacquiescence in Johnson).
[Vol. 40:1685
INTEREST FREE LOANS
term and demand loans constitute taxable gifts.2 In distinguishing term
from demand loans, the Service held that low interest term loans are tax-
able on the date made.' By contrast, demand loans are gifts in each calen-
dar quarter during which the loans remain outstanding. 4
The Tax Court decided Crown v. Commissioner" after the district
court's decision in Johnson66 and after the issuing of the Service's opinion
in Revenue Ruling 73-61.11 In holding for the taxpayer, the Tax Court in
Crown chose to rely on Johnson and disregard Revenue Ruling 73-61.11
The taxpayer in Crown made various interest-free demand loans to
relatives. 9 The Crown court relied on Johnson in finding that no taxable
gift resulted from making an interest-free loan."0 The Tax Court noted
that the Service only recently has begun to assert that the making of
noninterest-bearing loans constitutes a taxable event, even though the
statutory authority the Service relied on had been available since the
beginning of the income and gift tax laws.' Citing Dean, the Tax Court
also found that courts uniformly have rejected every attempt by the Ser-
vice to subject the making of noninterest-bearing loans to income and gift
taxes. 2 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision in Crown
3
on the grounds of the administrative difficulties the taxing of intrafamily
loans would cause74 and the uncertain use value of an interest-free de-
' 1973-1 C.B. at 408. See generally United States v. Bennett, 186 F.2d 407, 410"(5th
Cir. 1951) (Revenue Rulings are opinions of Internal Revenue Service's legal staff and have
no more binding or legal force than the opinion of any other lawyer).
" 1973-1 C.B. at 408. The Service in Revenue Ruling 73-61 reiterated the Service's
previous position that for federal gift tax purposes, the donor has made a completed gift
when he has relinquished dominion and control over the property and has no power to
change the disposition of the property. Id.; see Rev. Rul. 69-347, 1969-1 C.B. 227 (restriction
on donor's control over trust property).
" 1973-1 C.B. at 409. The Service in Revenue Ruling 73-61 held that the value of in-
terest on a demand loan is the value of the use of the money for that portion of the year
during which the donor in fact allows the donee to use the money. Id. According to the
Service, the value of the use of the money during the calendar quarter is calculable as
of the last day of each calendar quarter during which the donor has granted the donee
such use. Id.
67 T.C. 1060 (1977), aff'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966); see supra text accompanying notes 54-60 (Johnson
decision).
67 1973-1 C.B. 408; see supra text accompanying notes 62-64 (Rev. Rul. 73-61).
" See 67 T.C. at 1062 (Crown court's reliance on Johnson and rejection of Revenue
Ruling 73-61).
Id. at 1060-61.
,' Id. at 1063-65.
Id. at 1063. See generally I.R.C. S 2501 (West 1983) (imposition of gift tax); id. § 2511
(general scope of gift tax); Treas. Reg. S 25.2511-1(c)(1958) (specific scope of gift tax).
72 67 T.C. at 1064; see supra text accompanying notes 30-38 (discussion of Dean).
7 Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978), affg, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977).
" 585 F.2d at 241. The Seventh Circuit in Crown reasoned that the logical extension
of the Service's unequal exchange theory for imposing a gift tax in Crown would lead to
the imposition of a gift tax in circumstances in which a father lends $1000 to his son graduating
from college until the son can get established, or when a office worker lends a fellow employee
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mand loan.:5 The lack of specific statutory authority to support the im-
position of a gift tax on intrafamily loans76 and past avoidance of the issue
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner)77 also influenced
the Seventh Circuit to affirm the Tax Court's decision in Crown not to
impose a gift tax on the making of interest-free demand loans.78
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's
affirmation of the Tax Court's decision in Crown."9 The Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Dickman v. Commissioner' marks a departure from Crown and
$10 until the following payday. Id. Similar reasoning would necessitate the imposition of
a gift tax when a neighbor borrows a lawn mower and fails to return it immediately, or
when friends provide out-of-town guests with a night's lodging. Id. See generally infra note
117 (unequal exchange theory).
1 585 F.2d at 238-41. According to the Seventh Circuit in Crown, the imposition of
a gift tax at the time the lender extends an interest-free loan is impossible because the
value of the lender's right to repayment is unknown and unknowable. Id. at 238; see LR.C.
S 2512(a) (West 1983) (value of gift determined as of date of gift). Furthermore, the uncer-
tain due date of the loan precludes application of a present discounted value formula to
determine the value of the gift. 585 F.2d at 238; see infra note 117 (time value of money).
The reason for the lack of certainty of the value of the loan at the time of the loan is that
the transfer of the economic benefit is incomplete at that point, being totally dependent
on the lender's continuing willingness to refrain from demanding repayment. 585 F.2d at 238.
The Seventh Circuit also faulted the Service's cancellation of indebtedness method for
measuring the amount and timing of the gift. Id. at 238-39. According to the Crown court,
basing the gift tax on the market rate of interest at the close of each taxable quarter results
in a theoretically inaccurate measurement of the difference in value at the time of the loan
between the money loaned and the promise to repay. Id.; see I.R.C. § 2512(a) (value of gift
determined as of date of gift). The Crown court further reasoned that the finding of a tax-
able gift from the lender to the borrower is equivalent to saying that the lender had a
right to receive interest, which indebtedness he forgave. 585 F.2d at 240. The lack of a
borrower's legal obligation to pay interest, absent a contractual provision, militates against
the Service's cancellation of indebtedness approach to finding a taxable gift. Id.
" 585 F.2d at 237. The Crown court reasoned that policy considerations alone are in-
sufficient to impose a gift tax on interest-free loans. Id. The Service also must show that
the taxation of interest-free loans is within the contemplation of the gift tax statute. Id.
To date, no statutory language or legislative history deals specifically with interest-free
loans. Id. Broadly construing the present gift tax statutes to include interest-free loans
leads to theoretical and practical problems. Id. at 239-41; see supra note 75 (problem of valu-
ing interest free loan).
' 585 F.2d at 241. The Seventh Circuit in Crown faulted the Service for previously
failing to interpret the gift tax statutes as requiring the imposition of a gift tax on interest-
free loans. Id.; see I.R.C. §§ 2501-2524 (West 1983) (Code gift tax provisions). The Seventh
Circuit also faulted the Service for failing to appeal the Johnson decision and for waiting
seven years to announce the Service's nonacquiescence in the Johnson decision. 585 F.2d
at 241; see supra text accompanying notes 54-60 (discussion of Johnson); supra text accom-
panying notes 61-64 (Service announces nonacquiescence in Johnson decision in Rev. Rul.
73-61).
7 585 F.2d at 241; see supra text accompanying notes 65-72 (Tax Court's decision in
Crown).
' See infra text accompanying notes 80-112 (discussion of Dickman); supra text accom-
panying notes 65-78 (discussion of Crown).
690 F.2d 812 (11th Cir. 1982), rev'g, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 620 (1980).
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represents a split among the circuit courts81 and between the Eleventh
Circuit and the Tax Court" on the gift tax consequences of interest-free
loans. The taxpayer in Dickman made interest-free loans to a relative and
to a closely held corporation.' The Tax Court found that the loans were
on a demand basis and, relying on Johnson and Crown, held that the
loans involved no gift tax consequences.15 In reversing the Tax Court's
decision, the Eleventh Circuit held that the borrower of an interest-free
loan receives a taxable gift.' Rather than calling for additional legislation,'
the Eleventh Circuit found the scope of current Code provisions88 suffi-
cient to impose a gift tax on the lender of an interest-free loan. 9
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that section 2501(a)(1)10 of the Code
imposes a gift tax on any transfer of property by gift made by an individual
during the taxable year.8 Section 2511(a) 2 provides that the tax applies
whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether direct or indirect,
and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible. 3
Relying on the legislative history of the gift tax provisions, the Dickman
court interpreted the term "property" to include every kind of right or
interest protected by law and having a tangible exchange value.'5 The
Compare Dickman, 690 F.2d at 819 (Eleventh Circuit's holding that gratuitous interest-
free loans have gift tax consequences) with Crown, 585 F.2d at 235 (Seventh Circuit's holding
that gratuitous interest-free loans are not taxable as gifts).
Compare Dickmn, 690 F.2d at 819 (Eleventh Circuit's holding that gratuitous interest-
free loans have gift tax consequences) with Dickman, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) at 624 (Tax Court's
holding that no gift tax consequences arise from making interest-free loans) and Crown,
67 T.C. at 1065 (Tax Court refuses to view use value of money as taxable event for gift
tax purposes).
83 41 T.C.M. (CCH) at 621-22.
, Id. at 622.
Id. at 624; see supra text accompanying notes 54-60 (discussion of Johnson); supra
text accompanying notes 65-78 (discussion .of Crown).
"Dickman v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 812, 813 (11th Cir. 1982) (interest-free loans are
subject to gift tax whether loans made for fixed term or on demand basis), rev'g, 41 T.C.M.
(CCH) 620 (1980).
1 Compare 690 F.2d at 815 (Eleventh Circuit's finding in Dickman that language of
gift tax statute is broad enough to include all property arrangements) with Crown, 585
F.2d at 240 (Seventh Circuit's finding that to characterize mere use of property as a transfer
of a property right implies a broader concept of what constitutes a property right under
gift tax laws than previously has been recognized) and Crown, 67 T.C. at 1065 (Tax Court's
finding that expansion of scope of Code gift tax provisions should come through congres-
sional action and not through unnecessarily broad judicial interpretation).
' See I.R.C. §§ 2501-2524 (West 1983) (Code gift tax provisions).
' See 690 F.2d at 814-15 (broad statutory reach of current gift tax provisions).
I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1}(West 1983).
81 690 F.2d at 814.
I.R.C. 5 2511(a)(West 1983).
690 F.2d at 814.
" See H.R. REP. No. 708, supra note 13, at 27-28 ("gift" applies to all donative transfers
of property); S. REP. 665, supra note 13, at 39 (same).
95 690 F.2d at 814-15.
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court interpreted the gift transfer provision of section 2501 to include
all transactions in which a taxpayer gratuitously passes or transfers pro-
perty or property rights or interests to another regardless of the means
or device the taxpayer employs. 6 Citing to previous court decisions,' the
Eleventh Circuit broadly construed the gift tax provisions of the Code
and held that the right to use property, however contingent, constitutes
property for tax purposes. 8
The Dickman court's major departure from the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion in Crown was the Dickman court's holding that the demand nature
of an interest-free loan does not control gift tax consequences.9 The
Seventh Circuit in Crown reasoned that because the donor of a demand
loan could demand repayment of the loan at anytime, the recipient of the
loan, did not possess a legally protected property interest."l ' In contrast
to Crown, the Dickman court held that receipt of a demand loan is a prop-
erty interest, notwithstanding the absence of any rights with regard to
the transferor. 11' The Dickman court reasoned that the property interest
the demand loan transfers has an exchangeable value because the reci-
pient is free to transfer the property to another."2 According to the
Dickman court, the right to use money is the property right the taxpayer
transfers and the period of use is the means of valuing the gift.9 3
The Eleventh Circuit in Dickman criticized the Johnson and Crown
courts for their previous failure to recognize the gift tax consequences
of interest-free loans."4 While agreeing with the Johnson court's finding
that a taxpayer has no duty to invest property for profit,'015 the Dickman
court held that the absence of an investment duty is irrelevant to the
gift tax consequences of property a taxpayer transfers for less than ade-
quate consideration. 6 The Dickman court also faulted the Johnson court's
Id. at 814.
See Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945) ("gift" intended to have broad
and comprehensive application); Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184, 187 (1943) (gift tax
intended to reach every kind or type of transfer by gift); Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S.
176, 180 (1943) (gift tax statute broad enough to reach property interest however real or
personal, tangible or intangible, conceptual or contingent).
" 690 F.2d at 815-19.
Compare id. at 818 (Dickman court's finding that an "at will" interest in property
is a property right taxable under Code) with Crown, 585 F.2d at 239 (Seventh Circuit's find-
ing that no evidence exists to show recipient of loan payable on demand has legally pro-
tected property interest).
100 585 F2d at 237-39.
101 690 F.2d at 818.
102 Id.
113 Id. at 819.
I" Id. at 816-19; see supra text accompanying notes 54-60 (discussion of Johnson); supra
text accompanying notes 65-78 (discussion of Crown).
" 690 F.2d at 816-19; see supra text accompanying notes 59-60 (Johnson court's finding
of no duty to invest for profit).
100 690 F.2d at 817.
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finding that interest-free loans do not diminish estate taxes.'" The Dickman
court reasoned that because of the possibility of a discount for collection
as well as possible delay in repayment, the value of the lender-decedent's
right to repayment might be worth less than the face amount of the loan."0 8
The Dickman court disagreed with the Tax Court's finding in Crown
that the Commissioner's previous failure to assert the taxability of
noninterest-bearing loans precluded the assertion in Crown. °9 According
to Dickman, the Commissioner is free to correct previous mistakes."0 The
Dickman court also faulted the Seventh Circuit's interpretation in Crown
of the gift tax laws to exclude the use of property from the meaning of
property right taxable under the Code."' According to the Dickman court,
the right to use money constitutes a valuable property right taxable under
the federal gift tax provisions."2
Statutory authority and policy considerations support the Eleventh
Circuit's finding in Dickman that the making of an interest-free loan con-
stitutes the giving of a valuable property interest."' Secton 2501 of the
Code imposes a gift tax on the transfer of property for less than adequate
consideration."' The purpose of the gift tax provisions is to compensate
for any diminution in estate tax payable on the donor's death."' The theory
is that if the decedeht-donor had not made an inter vivos gift, the prop-
erty would have been part of his gross estate when he died."8 Taxation
of interest-free loans complies with the purpose of the gift tax provisions
because as long as the lender of an interest-free loan permits the loan
1"2 Id.; see supra text accompanying note 58 (Johnson court's finding that purpose of
loans was not to diminish estate taxes).
11 690 F.2d at 817.
109 Id.; see supra text accompanying note 71 (Tax Court's rationale in Crown for reject-
ing Service's gift tax assertion).
18 690 F.2d at 818. The Dickman court relied on case authority to support the court's
proposition that the Commissioner is free to change his earlier incorrect interpretations
of the law. See Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 72 (1965) (Commissioner's withdrawal
of acquiescence); Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 183 (1957) (Com-
missioner entitled to revoke erroneous interpretation of law).
690 F.2d at 818; see supra text accompanying note 100 (Seventh Circuit's rationale
in Crown for rejecting Service's gift tax assertion).
690 F.2d at 819.
" See infra text accompanying notes 114-126 (rationale for imposing gift tax on use
value of interest-free loan); supra text accompanying notes 80-112 (Dickman decision).
.. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(West 1983); see supra text accompanying notes 9-15 (donor's gift tax
liability for gifts made during the taxable year).
"' See H.R. REP. No. 708, supra note 13, at 28 (purpose of gift tax to supplement in-
come and estate taxes and to preclude avoidance of these taxes through a practice of inter
vivos giving); S. REP. No. 665, supra note 13, at 40 (same).
'I' Cf. H. R. REP. No. 708, supra note 13, at 28 (design and purpose of Code gift tax
provisions); S. REP. No. 665, supra note 13, at 40 (same). Prior to the Tax Reform Act of
1976, the gift tax rates were only 75% of the estate tax rates. Solomon, Gifts in Light of
Tax Reform, 12 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1700, 17-3 (1978). The lower gift tax rates provided
an obvious incentive for lifetime transfers. Id.
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to remain outstanding, the lender accepts less than the equal value of
the money he has transferred and consequently diminishes his estate for
estate tax purposes." 7
The holdings of the Johnson and Crown courts that the making of an
interest-free demand loan does not diminish the decedent-lender's estate
because a lender has no duty during life to invest for profit... fails to
recognize economic reality. The argument has little validity when the bor-
rower of an interest-free demand loan profits from investing the proceeds
of the loan."' Such a scheme effects a double tax avoidance because the
scheme not only diminishes the lender's gross estate but also allows the
"I See E. HELFERT, TECHNIQUES OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 140-43 (1982) (time value of
money); Blum, An Introduction to the Mathematics of Tax Planning, 57 TAXES 707, 708 (1979)
(same). In an economy of continuing inflation, the lessening real value of the dollar provides
borrowers an advantage over creditors. Id. Inflation coupled with the diminishing earning
power of money causes the present nominal value of a dollar paid in the future to be less
than a dollar paid immediately. Id. To the extent a present dollar is more valuable than
a future dollar, delayed repayment enables a borrower to make repayment in cheaper dollars.
Id. See generally Pulliam, Income and Gift Tax Implications of Nonbusiness Interest-Free Loans:
Looking a Gift Horse In the Mouth, 58 TAXES 675, 679 (1980) (lender's potential estate reduc-
ed by time value of money loaned).
Because the present value of a dollar is worth more than the value of a future dollar,
a loan given in exchange for a promissory note to repay in the future only the principal
of the loan results in an unequal exchange. O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-Free Loans,
27 VAND. LAW REV. 1085, 1088 (1974). The difference between the present value of the loan
and the future value of the promissory note represents the amount of the gift. Id- Ordinarily,
the date of the gift controls the valuation of the gift. See I.R.C. S 2512(a) (West 1983) (valua-
tion of gift determined on date gift made). In the case of term loans, the due date of the
loan makes valuation of the promissory note on the date of the gift relatively easy because
on the date the lender issues the loan the Service can discount the face value of the pro-
missory note to reflect the rate of inflation over the period of the loan. See O'Hare, supra,
at 1088 (suggested formula for determining gift value of interest-free term loans).
In contrast to term loans, the gift value of an interest-free demand loan on the date
the lender issues the loan is more difficult to compute because of the demand loan's uncer-
tain due date. Cf. I.R.C. S 2512(a) (valuation of gift determined on date gift made). The uncer-
tain gift value of the demand loan on the date of issuance has influenced courts to rule
against the taxability of interest-free demand loans. See, e.g., Crown v. Commissioner, 585
F.2d 234, 237-39 (7th Cir. 1978) (difficulties encountered in determining gift value of interest-
free demand loan). The Service's solution to the valuation problem is to view the interest-
free demand loan as incomplete when the lender makes the loan. See Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1
C.B. 408, 409. The Service in Revenue Ruling 73-61 reasoned that because the borrower
of an interest-free demand loan enjoys the right to use the loan only as long as the lender
refrains from recalling the loan, the value of the borrower's right is not ascertainable on
the date of exchange. Id. According to the Service, the gift of the interest-free demand
loan becomes complete only at the close of each calendar quarter during which the lender
refrains from recalling the loan. Id.
"8 See Johnson, 254 F. Supp. at 77 (parents under no duty to lend or invest money);
Crown, 67 T.C. at 1063-64 (taxpayer under no obligation to invest for profit).
11 See I.R.C. S 61(a) (4) (gross income includes interest). See generally Comment, Crown
v. Commissioner: Gift Taxation And Interest-Free Loans Among Family Members, 19 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 361, 371 (1977) (tax avoidance opportunities after Crown).
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lender to split taxable income." Because of the present progressive tax
rate, the free transfer of income from high to low tax brackets under-
mines the design and purpose of the income tax structure.' Incentive
for such transactions is especially strong with respect to intrafamily
transfers in which the lender can allocate his total wealth among individual
family members in varying tax brackets while at the same time retaining
his wealth within the family unit."
The demand loan recipient's lack of exclusive control over the loan
was a determining factor for the Tax Court in both Crown and Dickman
in deciding that an interest-free demand loan did not represent a valuable
property interest.2 The Tax Court's emphasis on the borrower's lack of
exclusive control, like the Tax Court's emphasis on the lender's lack of
an investment duty, also fails to recognize the economic context surround-
ing the interest-free demand loan.2 When divorced from a nonbusiness
context, the rights of the demand loan recipient appear less exclusive than
the rights of the term loan recipient. Distinguishing tax consequences on
this distinction becomes specious, however, when the demand loan is
viewed in its intrafamily context.'2 ' Because the majority of interest-free
demand loans are made between family members on a friendly basis in
which the likelihood of indiscriminate recall is remote, the Tax Court's
focus on the demand nature of the loan ignores the substance of the tran-
saction and encourages the use of income shifting as a tax avoidance
device.'26
In regard to the tax consequences of interest-free loans made outside
the family context, the difference between the Hardee court's analysis
and the Dean court's analysis stems from an attempt by both courts to
equalize the tax treatment of the interest-free loan borrower with the
Code treatment of other property users." The Dean court equated the
:M See Comment, supra note 119, at 371 (tax avoidance opportunities after Crown).
121 See H.R. REP. No. 708, supra note 13, at 28 (purpose of gift tax is to supplement
income and estate taxes and to preclude avoidance of these taxes through a practice of
inter vivos giving); S. REP. No. 665, supra note 13, at 40 (same); see also Smith v.
Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 179 n.1 (1943) (gift tax provisions intended not only to prevent
estate tax avoidance but also to prevent income tax avoidance through reducing gross in-
come and thereby escaping effect of progressive surtax rate). See generally Harriss, Legislative
History of Federal Gift Taxation, 18 TAXES 531,533 (1940) (congressional intent in enacting
Code gift tax provisions).
122 See Pulliam, supra note 117, at 679 (tax incentives for making interest-free loans
to family members).
1"3 See Dickman, 41 T.C.M. at 623 (demand and open account loans do not result in
taxable gifts); Crown, 67 T.C. at 1065 (no gift tax attaches to mere permissive use).




Compare 50 A.F.T.R.2d at 82-5255 (Hardee court equates interest-free loan to rent-
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borrower of an interest-free loan with the borrower of an interest-bearing
loan.'28 The Dean court reasoned that because the Code allows the bor-
rower of an interest-bearing loan a deduction from income for interest
the borrower paid or accrued on the loan during the taxable year,"
whether a taxpayer receives a loan interest free or is required to make
an interest payment should make no taxable difference."' In an attempt
to give effect to the economic reality of the two transactions, the Dean
court refused to treat the use value of the interest-free loan as income
to the borrower."' To hold otherwise would cause a disparity because the
interest-paying borrower would have a deduction from income for interest
paid while the interest-free borrower would realize additional income to
the extent of interest not paid or accrued."'
Unlike Dean, the Hardee court equated interest-free loans to the rent-
free use of property."' Under the Code, ordinary rental payments are not
deductible"4 and the rent-free use of property results in a taxable gain
to the recipient."' When an interest-free loan is equated to the rent-free
use of property, any attempt to equalize the tax treatment of the two
transactions requires the borrower of the interest-free loan to recognize
income as measured by the interest value of the funds borrowed."8
In reasoning that interest-free borrowers are entitled to the same tax
free use of corporate property) with 35 T.C. at 1090 (Dean court equates interest-free loans
to interest-bearing loans).
1" See 35 T.C. at 1090 (same tax results should apply to borrower of interest-free loan
or borrower of interest-bearing loan); supra text accompanying notes 30-35 (Dean court's
rationale).
'9 See I.R.C. S 163 (West 1983) (interest expense deduction).
13" See 35 T.C. at 1090 (same tax results should apply to borrower of interest-free loan
as borrower of interest-bearing loan); supra text accompanying notes 30-35 (Dean court's
rationale).
,3 See 35 T.C. at 1089-90 (no taxable gain to borrower of interest-free loan).
133 See id. at 1090 (Dean court's rationale for holding borrower of an interest-free loan
realizes no taxable gain); supra text accompanying notes 30-35 (same). See generally supra
note 52 (Judge Goldberg's explanation in Martin v. Commissioner of how treating as income
the use value of interest-free .Iemand loan would cause disparity between interest-free loan
recipient and interest-bearing loan recipient).
13 See 50 A.F.T.R.2d at 82-5255 (same result should apply to taxpayer who uses cor-
porate property rent-free as taxpayer who borrows corporate money interest-free).
134 See I.R.C. S 162(a) (3) (West 1983) (rent expense deduction allowed only when rented
property relates to carrying on of trade or business).
1' See, e.g., Gardner v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d 160, 162 (6th Cir. 1980) (free use of
company-owned car held to result in taxable gain); Chandler v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d
623, 626-28 (3d Cir. 1941) (rent-free use of corporate residence held to result in taxable gain);
Challenge Mfg. Co. v Commissioner, 37 T.C. 650, 663 (1962) (rent-free use of company owned
boat held to result in taxable gain); Frueauff v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 449, 451 (1934)
(rent-free use of corporate apartment held to result in taxable gain); I.R.C. S 61 (West 1983)
(gross income includes income from whatever source derived).
11 See 50 A.F.T.R.2d at 82-5255 (Hardee court's holding that use of corporate asset without
corresponding rent obligation and use of corporate money without interest expense obliga-
tion are economically indistinguishable and should result in same tax consequences).
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consequences as interest paying borrowers, the Dean majority overlooked
the fact that not all interest payments are deductible.1" The Dean majority
also overlooked the fact that the Code entitles the interest paying bor-
rower to an interest deduction by virtue of a previously paid or accrued
interest expense." The Code provides direct authority for the Hardee
court's conclusion that a taxpayer may deduct only interest expenses paid
or accrued.39 Section 163 of the Code allows an interest deduction for all
interest paid or accrued during the taxable year on indebtedness.14 Because
the holder of an interest-free loan neither pays nor accrues an interest
expense, the holder may not take a deduction under section 163 of the
Code."' The taxpayers in Dean neither paid nor accrued an interest
expense1 2 The Dean majority presumed the availability of the deduction."
To the extent the Dean majority granted the taxpayers a deduction
without first requiring an interest expense, the Dean decision conflicts
with section 163 of the Code.'M The Dean decision is also at variance with
other cases which have denied an interest deduction upon failure to prove
an interest expense.145
Presently the tax consequences of interest-free loans to family
members is uncertain. 4 ' The Tax Court has refused to impose a gift tax
on the making of interest-free loans to relatives. 4 ' The recent reversal
of the Tax Court's Dickman decision, however, reveals that unlike the
1" 35 T.C. at 1091 (Opper, J., dissenting); see, e.g., I.R.C. S 265(2) (West 1983). Section
265(2) of the Code does not allow the taxpayer to deduct interest expense on indebtedness
when the taxpayer incurs the indebtedness in the purchase of assets which pay tax exempt
interest. Id. See generally supra note 19 (nondeductible interest expenses).
11 See I.R.C. 5 163(a) (West 1983). Section 163(a) of the Code provides a deduction only
for interest the taxpayer has paid or accrued. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 41-53
(Hardee court's disagreement with Dean court's off-setting deductiblity rationale); see also
supra text accompanying notes 34-35 (Dean court's off-setting deductibility rationale).
1 See supra note 138 (Code § 163(a)).
',' See supra note 138 (Code § 163(a)).
... Cf.I.R.C. § 163(a) (West 1983). Section 163(a) of the Code provides a deduction only
for interest the taxpayer has paid or accrued. Id. But see supra note 52 (Judge Goldberg's
criticism in Martin v. Commissioner of the Service's literal reading of Code § 163(a)).
1 35 T.C. at 1083.
143 Id. at 1090.
14 Compare id. (Dean court imputes interest deduction) with I.R.C. § 163(a) (West 1983)
(taxpayer allowed deduction only for interest expense actually paid or accrued).
" See, e.g., Woodward v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 14, 27 (N.D. Iowa 1952) (taxpayer
claiming interest deduction must prove interest expense), aff'd, 208 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1953);
Hart v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 485, 501 (1950) (interest deduction denied when tax-
payer could not prove payment represented interest expense); A. Backus Jr. & Sons v.
Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 590, 592 (1927) (taxpayer must make strict proof of deductible
expenses).
148 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 30-112 (differing judicial interpretations of reach
of income and gift tax provisions of Code).
1" See supra text accompanying notes 54-60 (Johnson decision); supra text accompany-
ing notes 65-72 (Tax Court's reliance on Johnson in Crown); supra text accompanying note
85 (Tax Court's reliance on Crown and Johnson in Dickman).
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Tax Court the Eleventh Circuit is willing to impose a gift tax on the lender
of an interest-free loan.1 4 ' The income tax consequences of interest-free
loans made outside the family situation are also uncertain." Although
Dean apparently had resolved the issue," the decision of the Court of
Claims in Hardee demonstrates that the issue of the income tax conse-
quences to the borrower of an interest-free loan is still open to debate.15'
The conflicting opinions on the issue arise from disagreement over whether
to equate the receipt of an interest-free loan to the rent-free use of prop-
erty or to the receipt of an interest-bearing loan. 5' Solution to the tax
consequences of interest-free loans may be achieved through congressional
enactment of a specific statutory provision." More probably, because of
the diversity of rulings on the issue," the Supreme Court will provide
the more immediate resolution to the question of the income and gift tax
consequences of interest-free loans.
DANIEL E. RILEY
148 See supra text accompanying notes 79-112 (Dickman decision).
14 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 30-53 (Dean and Hardee decisions).
15 See supra text accompanying notes 30-35 (Dean decision).
151 See supra text accompanying notes 42-53 (Hardee decision). After preparation of this
note for publication, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed
the United States Court of Claims in Hardee v. United States. See 708 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir.
1983). The Federal Circuit followed the Tax Court's decision in Dean in holding that an
interest-free loan from a corporation to its principal shareholder posed no income tax con-
sequences. See id. at 663-68. The Federal Circuit avoided serious consideration of the Dean
rationale by holding that interest-free loans fell outside the accepted definition of taxable
income. See id. at 665. The Federal Circuit concluded that because the definition of taxable
income did not include the interest-free use of money, issues such as the lack of statutory
authority to support an imputed deduction for an imputed interest payment were immaterial.
See id. The long standing practice of treating interest-free loans as tax free which the Dean
decision established formed the basis of the Federal Circuit's refusal to depart from Dean.
See id. at 664. The Federal Circuit found that Congress, not the courts, has the prerogative
to change practices which have coalesced over time into rules of law. See id.
15 See supra text accompanying notes 127-136 (Hardee court's comparison of interest-
free loans to rent-free use of property and Dean court's comparison of interest-free loans
to interest-bearing loans).
3 See generally SECTION 484: INTEREST ON CERTAIN LOANS (ABA Legislative Proposal
1983). The ABA proposes that on the date the borrower repays the principal of the interest-
free loan, an amount equal to the unstated interest be deemed paid by the lender to the
borrower and then paid by the borrower to the lender as interest on the indebtedness.
Id. Under this proposal, the borrower would recognize income and also be entitled to an
offsetting interest expense deduction. Id. See also Comment, Hardee v. United States: Income
Tax Consequences of Interest-Free Loans, 36 TAx LAWYER 1225 (1983) (tax parity treatment
only realistic way to handle economic benefits flowing from interest-free loans).
11 See supra text accompanying notes 30-112 (differing judicial opinions on tax conse-
quences of interest-free loans).
[Vol. 40:1685
